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Abstract
To study dynamic pricing in airline markets it is essential to model the time variation
of the distribution of fares that airlines assign to all the airplane’s seats. We show how
a flight’s fare distribution is set in practice and its consistency with the properties of
a theoretical model. First, fare distributions are increasing across seats. Second, over
time fare distributions move downward to reflect the perishable nature of seats. Third,
we find that the fare observed by prospective buyers tends to increase as the date of
departure nears.
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1 Introduction
The definition of dynamic pricing (DP) in airline markets, both in the economic and opera-
tional research academic literature, as well as in the press, has been so far intrinsically related
to the description of how fares on sale evolve over time (McAfee and te Velde, 2007). The
world-wide success of Low Cost Carriers (LCCs) has reinforced the view that the temporal
fluctuations of observed fares constitute the central part of a carrier’s Revenue Management
(RM) system (McGill and Van Ryzin, 1999; Talluri and van Ryzin, 2004).
Current literature provides overwhelming evidence in favor of a fare fluctuation, as well
as of a temporally increasing fare path (Bergantino and Capozza, 2015; Bilotkach et al.,
2010; Gaggero and Piga, 2010; Stavins, 2001). Such a finding is, however, extremely at odds
with standard theoretical models predicting a declining time-path of fares, to the point that
McAfee and te Velde (2007), when commenting the findings from their own data analysis,
state that those models are empirically non-validated.
In this paper we address such a divergence head-on by developing a theoretical model
whose equilibrium properties are consistent with the empirical findings based on an original
dataset of airline fares with unique characteristics. Our new theoretical model emphasizes
the role of two forces, which are at work simultaneously to determine the fares of every
seat available on a flight. First, airlines sell a highly perishable service. As pointed out by
McAfee and te Velde (2007) and Sweeting (2012), fares should decrease as the departure
date approaches, because so does the option value of waiting to sell to only higher demand
customers (“temporal dimension”). Second, airlines sell a limited number of seats. Thus,
fares should increase as the number of seats tend to reduce, as scarcity increases (“capacity
dimension”) (Puller et al., 2009; Talluri and van Ryzin, 2004). These two forces operate in
different directions, so their relevance should be based on the extent by which their expected
impact conforms to the actual temporal patterns of fare data.
A major limitation of the studies in the airline pricing, which is also at the core of the
divergence identified but not solved in McAfee and te Velde (2007), rests on the fact that they
only rely on transaction fares, which are the joint outcome of both the temporal and capacity
dimensions. We argue that to study the problem in a more suitable setting, it is necessary
to abandon the analysis based on a single fare (notably, that of the seat on sale) so far used
in the literature and adopt, as a building block, the notion of a fare distribution as in Dana
(1999) and Gallego and van Ryzin (1994). Loosely speaking, the focus on a fare distribution
implies that, during the booking period, the airline does not limit itself to define only the
fare of the seat on sale, but also of all the remaining seats on the flight. We document that
this corresponds indeed to the practice of many airlines, which, on their computer reservation
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systems, post fares for all the seats available on a flight. The experimental design of our data
collection exploits such a feature and generates a dataset that we use to model the pricing
of as many seats in the distribution as we could obtain from the website of a large European
Low Cost Carrier.
The equilibrium solution of the theoretical model is characterized by two main proper-
ties. First, to reflect the capacity dimension, the optimal fare distribution is increasing across
seats. Second, the temporal dimension operates so that each seat in the distribution presents
a declining value over the booking period. Thus, the model extends the theoretical results in
Dana (1999), by allowing for the carrier’s possibility to modify its fare distribution in differ-
ent, but discrete, time intervals. To emphasize the empirical implications of the theoretical
setting, this study is the first in the literature to show how fare distributions are shaped
in practice. Our simulated results conform to our data showing that fare distributions are
stepwise increasing: the airline arranges seats into groups, denoted as “buckets”, where each
bucket is defined by an increasing price tag and a variable size. Such distributions are found
to be used, with no exception, in all the 37,489 flights in our sample.
Through the characterization of such distributions at a flight’s level, we can extend and
better define DP in airline markets. Our assessment of what constitutes DP is different from
the one used so far in the literature. Indeed, due to the way the capacity dimension works in
practice, we do not classify fare increases over time as DP when such increases arise from a
movement along the distribution. This is because most fare increases can occur without any
change in the distribution: when a bucket is sold out, the seats allocated to the next higher
bucket are put on sale. Instead, we consider as an instance of DP only a situation involving
an identifiable change in the fare distribution. That is, we rule out the fare variations that so
far have taken a central role in the literature on DP. Based on this definition, distributions
remain, on average, unchanged for about 2-3 consecutive days.
Furthermore, the data reveal that DP takes many forms and shapes, involving not only
fare variations but, most importantly, changes in the distribution that result in variations of
the buckets’ size, as well as, occasionally, the creation/deletion of new buckets. In particular,
we show how the temporal dimension operates by giving rise to a form of DP that may not
involve any change in the fare for the next seat on sale. This happens when the carrier shifts
some seats from higher to lower-priced buckets, thus generating a decreasing profile for all
the fares in the distribution, in line with theoretical predictions.
Our descriptive identification of new forms of DP provides a useful backdrop for the
econometric analysis, which uses insights from the theoretical model to tease out the separate
impact of the capacity and the temporal dimensions on online posted fares. With regards
to the latter dimension, to our knowledge, this is the first study to provide a combined
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theoretical and empirical evaluation of the temporal dimension as revealed by a declining
option value (McAfee and te Velde, 2007). Thanks to the focus on a fare distribution, we
can track the evolution of the fare of all its seats over time, by defining a unique and time-
invariant position of each seat in the distribution. The analysis provides strong empirical
support in favor of the theoretical models predicting a declining option value. While a similar
finding has been shown in Sweeting (2012) for the price of single baseball ticket sold on the
second-hand market, a crucial difference here is to show that, at the same time, i) the carrier
adopts a stepwise increasing fare distribution designed to induce the upward movement of
fares consistent with the capacity dimension and, ii) it engages in DP to accommodate the
declining value of all the seats in the distribution. This practice is carried out, as previously
mentioned, by shifting seats initially allocated to the higher-priced buckets to lower-priced
ones, and, hence, represents a mechanism that may lead to the disappearance of the higher-
priced buckets from the distribution. Because the upper buckets are normally not observed
by customers, the airline can thus engage in “hidden” DP in ways that effectively reduce, if
necessary, the average selling fare of all remaining seats, without revealing to have done so.
Interestingly, contrary to the common belief that airlines rely on DP to charge higher fares,
we highlight how DP can achieve the opposite effect.
To assess the impact of the capacity dimension, we test whether the fare distribution is
increasing across seats’ positions, as predicted by the theoretical model. We find that the
capacity dimension plays a significant role in driving fares upwards: on average, the sale of
an extra seat (i.e., a move to the right in the fare distribution) is accompanied by a fare
increase of about 1.6-2.0 percent, depending on specifications (see also Alderighi et al. (2015)
for a similar result).
Finally, similar in spirit to Gerardi and Shapiro (2009), we reconcile our approach to that
traditionally followed in the literature of airline pricing, and in McAfee and te Velde (2007)
in particular, by modelling only the fare of the first seat on sale, i.e., the one customers can
easily observe when they issue the query for a ticket. In specifications where we omit the
seat position, that is, the number of seats still available on the flight, we also find that fares
of the seat on sale have an increasing temporal path. This is due to the effect of the capacity
dimension: as time passes, the plane fills up and the fare moves up accordingly. Importantly,
when we include the seat position, and thus control for a flight’s load factor at the time the
fare was posted, the estimates continue to provide support to the theoretical prediction of a
declining option value.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section revises the main contri-
butions of both theoretical and empirical literature. Then the theoretical model is presented.
The collection of fare data is described in Section 4 followed by real-world examples of fare
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distributions and then by a descriptive analysis on dynamic pricing. Section 6 carries the
econometric investigation out, testing the properties of the theoretical model’s equilibrium
solution described in Section 3. Finally, Section 7 summarizes and concludes.
2 Literature review
In the economics literature, DP is associated to a price change that is directly linked to at
least one intervening factor or event that induces a revision of the pricing approach followed
by the firm. For instance, the decreasing prices of Major League Baseball tickets in secondary
markets in Sweeting (2012) constitute a clear indication of an active DP intervention by sellers
in the form of the decision to relist the ticket at a lower price.
In airline markets, the way fares are set plays a central role in any empirical analysis aimed
at defining and identifying DP; Borenstein and Rose (1994) distinguish between systematic
and stochastic peak-load pricing as sources of fare dispersion in the U.S. market. In the
former, the fare variation is based on foreseeable and anticipated changes in shadow costs
known before a flight is opened for booking, while the latter reflects a change during the
selling season in the probability that demand for a flight exceeds capacity. In this sense, DP
and stochastic peak-load pricing may be considered as synonymous. More importantly, the
distinction in Borenstein and Rose (1994) can be related to carriers’ RM activity, intended
broadly as a process of i) setting ticket classes, i.e., fare levels and associated restrictions
(refundability, advance purchase, business vs. economy, etc.) and ii) defining the number
of seats available at each fare.1 RM thus encompasses both a systematic and a dynamic
pricing dimension, where the former can be seen as the outcome of the process just before
a flight enters its booking period, and the latter represents subsequent changes over time to
the initial composition of ticket classes both in terms of fare levels and number of seats in
each class.
As far as the systematic approach is concerned, Dana (1999) illustrates how, in a theo-
retical model with demand uncertainty and costly capacity, it is optimal for firms to commit
to an increasing fare distribution, where each fare reflects the fact that the shadow cost of
capacity is inversely related with a seat’s probability to be sold. Puller et al. (2009) refer to
this as “scarcity-based” pricing. The main ensuing testable prediction from Dana’s model
is that the fare charged should reflect the ranked position of the seat on sale in the fare
distribution. To implement such a test, it is therefore necessary to know a flight’s load factor
at the time a fare is either posted online or a ticket is sold. This issue has been empirically
1RM involves a number of ancillary activities and techniques useful in the process (McGill and Van Ryzin,
1999; Talluri and van Ryzin, 2004).
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tackled either by the use of web crawling methods (Alderighi et al., 2015), or of seat maps
posted by online travel agents (Clark and Vincent, 2012; Escobari, 2012). All these works
provide evidence in support to the hypothesis of fares increasing as a flight fills up. Interest-
ingly, Alderighi et al. (2015) derive their results by using two fares, the seat on sale and the
last seat in the distribution; their approach is further extended in the present work, where
we model the fare for all the seats in the fare distribution.
Because in Dana (1999) firms cannot change the initial distribution they set, the model
cannot provide any theoretical prediction on how firms would modify the fare distribution
over time. That is, would all fares start low and then increase or start high and then
decrease? The question of the optimal temporal profile of fares is generally addressed in the
operational research literature surveyed in Talluri and van Ryzin (2004) and in McAfee and
te Velde (2007). A drawback in this literature is that, unlike Dana (1999), either fares or
seat inventory levels are treated as exogenous. In fare-setting models the focus is on the
opportunity cost of selling one unit of capacity, i.e., the value not-to-sell the unit today and
reserve it for a future sale. As shown in Sweeting (2012), under standard conditions common
to most models, the value of the option not-to-sell is expected to fall over time, leading to
a similar prediction for fares. However, because such a prediction arises from models that
treat seat inventory as exogenous, it is not possible to extend it directly to the case where the
airlines adopt, as the empirical literature suggests, a pricing system based on the definition
of a fare distribution over capacity units. In the theoretical model of the next Section, we
show that if airlines can revise the fare distribution more than once, then under standard
assumptions of demand, customers’ evaluations and arrival rates being constant over time,
the fares of all the seats are expected to decline over time (temporal dimension).
Various reasons explain why fares could increase over time. First, offering advance-
purchase discounts can be an optimal strategy when both individual and/or aggregate de-
mand is uncertain (i.e., individuals learn their need to travel at different points in time
and airlines cannot predict which flight will enjoy peak demand), and consumers have het-
erogenous valuations (e.g., they either incur different “waiting costs” if they take a flight
that does not leave at their ideal time or they simply value the flight differently).2 Second,
the revenue management models that predict a declining option value assume a constant
distribution of willingness to pay, and therefore do not account for the fact that business
travelers tend to book at a later stage (Alderighi et al., 2016). Third, those models assume
an exogenous demand process and thus abstract from the presence of strategic buyers, i.e.,
those who maximize long-run utility by considering whether to postpone their purchases
2See Gale and Holmes (1993, 1992), Dana (1998) and Mo¨ller and Watanabe (2010).
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hoping to obtain a lower fare. In a model characterized by uncertainty, advance production
and inter-temporal substitutability in demand induced by strategic behavior, Deneckere and
Peck (2012) predict that the prices set by competitive firms are martingales, i.e., they do not
follow a predictable pattern. An often observed approach to discourage strategic waiting is
to commit to a nondecreasing price temporal path (Li et al., 2014).
The present work makes the novel point that the capacity dimension is the driving force
pushing the fare of the seat on sale upward, although with occasional markdowns consistent
with the prediction in Deneckere and Peck (2012). It does also investigate the extent by
which DP is applied by the carriers to take advantage of the larger proportion of business
buyers during the last week before a flight’s departure.
3 Theoretical background
In this Section we offer a stylized model of RM which translates some key elements of RM
practices into economic terms. First, carriers sell multiple indivisible units (seats). Second,
carriers charge a very limited number of fares (holding class fixed). Our data (see below)
suggest that there are about 12 to 18 different economy fares in each flight over the entire
selling period. Third, carriers price in distribution, that is, in each period they assign a fare
to all the seats in a flight; this is because, in each period, a carrier can sell more than one seat
and possibly all the seats of the flight. Fourth, fare distributions remain fixed over discrete
time intervals. Escobari et al. (2016) report evidence suggesting airlines revise their prices
overnight; in our data, distributions last unchanged for two-three days on average.
A carrier operates a single flight with N > 1 seats on a monopolistic route. The flight
is sold over T ≥ 1 selling periods: t = T, T − 1, . . . , 2, 1 describes the number of periods
remaining before departure (t = 1 is the last selling period and t = T is the first one), and
t = 0 is the departure date. For each t, the carrier commits to a sequence of fares for all the
M ≤ N remaining seats of the flight. Thus, until seat m = M, . . . , 2, 1 has not been sold,
each traveler presenting in selling period t faces fare p (m, t). Within the selling period t,
once seat m has been sold, then the next fare on offer becomes p (t,m− 1). At the end of
the selling period t, the unsold seats are offered in the next period, t− 1, until t = 1. Seats
available at the end of the last selling period remain unsold.3
In each period t, a set of consumers h = 0, 1, 2, ..,∞ arrives sequentially. The probability
that the first consumer arrives in t is ϕ1,t ∈ (0, 1), and that consumer h+1 arrives conditional
3The use of reverse indexes for both periods and seats simplifies the notation and the proofs. It also
establishes a direct link to the empirical part of the paper, where the position of seats is counted by starting
from the last one.
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on the fact that consumer h has already appeared is ϕh+1,t ∈ (0, 1). Consumer (h, t) is myopic
and her willingness to pay is a random variable θh,t, with (right-continuous) cumulative
distribution Fh,t on the compact support Θ, with
¯
θ = inf Θ > 0 and θ¯ = sup Θ <∞.4
We make the following simplifying assumptions: for any h = 0, 1, 2, ..,∞ and t = 1, .., T ,
ϕh,t = ϕh+1,t = ϕ ∈ (0, 1); Fh,t = Fh+1,t = F . Thus, we assume that the arrival process is
memoryless and consumers have the same ex-ante evaluation. The probability of selling the
first available seat at the fare p is:
q (p) = ϕ (1− F (p))
∞∑
h=0
(ϕF (p))h =
ϕ (1− F (p))
1− ϕF (p) ∈ [0, 1] , (1)
where ϕ (1− F (p)) is the probability that consumer h arrives and buys at fare p provided
that consumers 1, .., h− 1 have previously refused to buy at the same fare; and (ϕF (p))h is
the probability that consumers from 1 to h arrived and did not buy.
The carrier’s maximization problem is denoted by the following Bellman equation:
V (t,M) = max
p∈Θ
{q (p) [p+ V (t,M − 1)] + (1− q (p))V (t− 1,M)} , (2)
with boundary conditions V (t, 0) = 0 and V (0,M) = 0, for any t ∈ {0, .., T} and
M ∈ (0, .., N). Unlike the existing literature, the novel approach in equation (2) assumes
the possibility that more than one seat can be sold within each t: this implies the need to
set always a (possibly different) fare for all the seats on an aircraft. Moreover, equation (2)
entails a trade-off between selling now at least one seat (gaining p and the revenue flow coming
from the remaining seats, V (t,M − 1)), and keeping the capacity intact and postpone the
sale to the next period, gaining V (t− 1,M).
Note that because the solution of the maximization problem can be reached backwards
and recursively, the optimal fare of seat m ≤ M in period t when there are M seats avail-
able, p∗(t,m,M), is independent of the total number of available seats M in period t, i.e.
p∗(t,m,M) = p∗(t,m,M + 1), for any M = 1, . . . , N − 1 and t = 1, . . . , T . This property is
a consequence of the assumption that the arrival process is memoryless. Indeed, by having
ϕ depending on the number of travellers already arrived during the period implies that the
optimal fare is also affected by the total number of available seats at the beginning of the
period and, in general, p(t,m,M) is not necessary equal to p(t,m,M + 1). In what follows,
we refer to the optimal fare of seat m at time t as p∗(t,m) without indexing for the number
of available seats since it plays no role with current assumptions.
4This guarantees the existence of a solution of the problem. Moreover, note that the random variable θh,t
can be one of continuous, discrete or mixed type.
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Definition 1 V (t,M) has decreasing differences in t and M , respectively, if and only if, for
any t = 1, .., T and M = 1, .., N :
V (t,M)− V (t− 1,M) ≤ V (t,M − 1)− V (t− 1,M − 1)
V (t,M)− V (t,M − 1) ≤ V (t− 1,M)− V (t− 1,M − 1) .
Definition 2 V (t,M) has increasing differences in (t,M) if and only if for any tH > tL and
MH > ML, we have:
V (tH ,MH)− V (tL,MH) ≥ V (tH ,ML)− V (tL,ML) .
The following proposition characterizes the value function described in (2).
Proposition 1 The value function V (t,M) : {0, 1, .., T} × {0, 1, .., N} → R is non negative
and exhibits positive but decreasing differences in t and M , and increasing differences in
(t,M).
Proposition 1 has important implications for our analysis. First, V (t,M) is increasing
in (t,M), which is a standard results in the pricing literature (Gallego and van Ryzin, 1994;
McAfee and te Velde, 2007). Second, periods and seats can be seen as two factors affecting
firm’s profits, which generate positive but decreasing value: the additional impact of one
period (or one seat) is lower when the number of periods (seats) increases. Third, increasing
differences in (t,M) is a form of complementarity. The larger the selling periods and the
higher the return from an additional seat, and vice versa. From these properties we derive
Corollary 1, which is essential for the characterization of the optimal fare p∗(t,m).
Corollary 1 Let X (t,M) = V (t− 1,M)− V (t,M − 1), then:
X (t,M) ≤ X (t− 1,M) , for any t = 2, .., T and M = 1, .., N (3)
X (t,M) ≥ X (t,M − 1) , for any t = 1, .., T and M = 2, .., N (4)
Assuming that the optimal fare p∗(t,m) which solves (2) is unique, then:
Proposition 2 The optimal fare p (t,m) has the following properties:
A. (capacity dimension) p(t,m) ≤ p(t,m− 1), for any t = 0, .., T and M = 1, .., N ,
B. (temporal dimension) p(t,m) ≤ p(t− 1,m), for any t = 1, .., T and M = 0, .., N .
Proof. From the maximization problem in (2), the optimal fare p∗(t,m) can be written as
a function of X:
p∗(X) = arg max
p∈Θ
{q (p) [p+X]} (5)
8
Let ρ = θ¯ − p and H(ρ,X) = q (p¯− ρ) [p¯− ρ+X]. From Definition 2, after some compu-
tations, we obtain that H has increasing differences in (ρ,X), if and only if, for ρ′ ≥ ρ (i.e.
p′ ≤ p) and X ′ ≥ X, we have:
[q(p¯− ρ′)− q(p¯− ρ)] (X ′ −X) ≥ 0, (6)
which is always satisfied seeing that q is decreasing in p. From the Topkis (1998)’s Theorem
2.8.2, when H has increasing differences in (ρ,X) then
X ′ ≤ X =⇒ ρ∗(X ′) ≥ ρ∗(X)⇐⇒ p∗(X ′) ≤ p∗(X). (7)
From (7) and Corollary 1, we obtain the proof.
Proposition 2.A states that, within a given period, seats are sold by setting a sequence
of fares (i.e. a fare distribution) which is (non-strictly) increasing, implying that the fare of
the seat on sale may increase every time a seat is sold. This property of the fare distribution
reflects the fact that the higher the fare, the lower the likelihood to sell a given seat, and,
consequently, the following seats. Thus, a high fare for the seat on sale produces an expected
loss of revenue that is increasing in the remaining seats. Since each fare is set on the basis
of a balancing between filling up the flight and increasing margins on each seat, a carrier
charges lower fares for the first seats on sale and higher fares for the next ones. This result
extends the cost-based justification of an increasing equilibrium fare distribution considered
in Dana (1999).
Proposition 2.B predicts that the fares of all the seats in the distribution tend to decrease
over time. This result reflects the perishable nature of the airline service, and the fact that
the option value decreases over time. When the number of periods is high, a carrier has
multiple chances to sell seats, but approaching the departure date, the likelihood of selling
each seat of the (remaining) fare distribution decreases and therefore, the carrier reduces the
fares of all seats. This is standard for highly perishable services, as illustrated in Sweeting
(2012), where however the analysis is limited to the case of a single ticket and not to a full
fare distribution as in the present case.
To further investigate the nature of the properties in Proposition 2, we solve equation
(2) numerically using calibrated parameters derived on the basis of data employed in the
econometric analysis below. In particular, we restrict the example to 39 seats which can
be sold at the fare levels (or bucket prices) reported in Column 1 of Table 1. That is, we
assume that travellers’ willingness to pay (WTP) is drawn from a discrete distribution whose
probability density function (pdf) is reported in Column 2 of the Table. Therefore, the fare
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distribution in every period is stepwise increasing and can be summarised by simply reporting
the number of seats in each bucket. Consumers’ arrival frequency is set so that the average
number of available seats at the end of the flight is around eight.5
Each column in Table 1 conforms to property A. of Proposition 2. We denote as a
“bucket” the set of seats carrying the same fare tag.6 For instance, in the first period (period
11) the seats are allocated across buckets of different sizes: five at the fare 65, six at the fare
80 and so on and so forth up until fare 200 with three seats. Note that although there is
a relatively high proportion of customers with a WTP of 50, no seats are allocated to this
bucket. In the last period 1, each of the three remaining seats is allocated to a different
bucket. Property B. is clearly revealed by the fact that the size of the upper buckets tends to
shrink over time, leading to their disappearance. However, it is stress-worthy that Property
B. also affects seats in lower buckets alike. If it did not, at period 7, when seventeen seats
have previously been sold, the selling fare would be that of the seventeenth seat in period 11,
that is, 95, while it is still 80 and remains so in subsequent period when extra seats are sold.
As a combined result of both properties, the fare of the first seat on sale tends to increase,
moving from 65 to 80 and eventually 95.
Figure 1 provides a graphical representation of the content of Table 1.
4 Data
Our collected sample comprises a total of 37,489 daily flights scheduled to depart during
the period May 2014 - June 2015, covering 74 European bi-directional routes. The fares for
those flights whose outward journey originates in the UK are expressed in British Pounds
and represent about 99% of the entire sample. The residual 1%, which refers to European
routes outside the UK, is collected in euro.7
5We set the average total number of prospective travellers L = 5/4 N = 48.75, which implies ϕ =
L/(L+ T ) = 0.81.
6The term is drawn from the revenue management literature (McGill and Van Ryzin, 1999; Talluri and
van Ryzin, 2004)
7When necessary fares in euro are converted in pounds using the daily Eurostat exchange rate of the day
when the fare is collected. See http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/exchange-rates/data/database. Saturdays
and Sundays adopt the exchange rate of the previous Friday.
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4.1 Sample Collection
The data collection employed a web crawler, as widely used in the literature.8 Every day, the
crawler automatically connected to the website of easyJet, the second largest European LCC,
and issued queries specifying the route, the date of departure and the number of seats to be
booked. Because European LCCs charge each leg independently and there is no pricing-in-
network considerations to account for, to double the data size, the query was for a return
flight, with a return date 4 days after the first leg (Bachis and Piga, 2011).9
The query dates were set such that a flight entered our database about four months before
departure; it was then surveyed at 10-days intervals until 30 days before departure, and
subsequently at more frequent intervals (21, 14, 10, 7, 4 and 1) to get a better understanding
of the price evolution as the date of departure nears. The website’s response to the query
included, for each leg, flight information for three different dates: the set date, the day before
and after. Overall, each query allowed the saving of three consecutive days’ information for
each leg. For each flight, the crawler saved the dates of departure and of the query (to
calculate the number of days separating the query date from take-off), the time of the day
the flight was due to depart and arrive, the departure and arrival airports (the route), the
price for the number of seats specified in the query. The crawler also saved an important
information published by the carrier: the number of seats available at a given posted fare.
This is central for the validation of the data treatment implemented to derive the price
distributions from the posted fares, as illustrated in the Appendix.10
To the best of our knowledge, the empirical literature on airline pricing focuses on the fare
of one seat, namely, the seat being on sale at the time of the query. A central contribution of
this paper is to show that this is not sufficient to test the implications of theoretical models
of DP in airline markets. Based on the model presented in Section 3, our data collection
incorporates an experimental design explicitly aimed at recovering a flight’s fare distribution,
as it is actually stored on the carriers’ web reservation system. In practice, this entailed the
implementation of the following procedure. For each flight and departure date, the crawler
8For the airline market, see Li et al. (2014), Gaggero and Piga (2011), Clark and Vincent (2012), Ober-
meyer et al. (2013), Escobari (2012), Bilotkach et al. (2015), Alderighi et al. (2015) and Alderighi et al. (2016),
amongst others. Cavallo (2017) and Gorodnichenko and Talavera (2017) make international comparisons of
online prices in retail markets.
9As in the case of Ryanair in Alderighi et al. (2015), easyJet offers seats where the buyer’s name and dates
can be changed only by paying a fixed fee which is often as high as the fare itself. The carrier also offers
a “Flexi” fare, corresponding to the basic fare we retrieve plus a set of add-ons (extra luggage, cancelation
refunds etc), which however can also be bought independently.
10The possibility that posted fares could be affected by the number of queries executed was managed as
follows. First, the cookie folder was cleaned every day; second, we checked a sample of fares retrieved by the
computers in our university office with queries made on the same day from computers outside that university.
No noticeable differences between the queries made from different computers could be found.
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started by requesting the price of one seat, and then continued by sequentially increasing the
number of seats by one unit. The sequence would stop either because the maximum number
of seats in a query, equal to 40, was reached or at a smaller number of seats. As in Alderighi
et al. (2015), the latter case directly indicates the exact number of seats available on the
flight on a particular query date, which we store in a variable called Available Seats to track
how a flight occupancy changes as the departure date nears. The former case corresponds
to a situation where we know that at least 40 seats still remain to be sold on a given query
date; i.e., Available Seats is censored at 40.
After applying the treatment described in the Appendix to the retrieved fares, we obtained
the flights’ distribution of posted fares over the available seats on a query date. An example
of such distributions is shown in Figure 2, which is based on the data of a randomly selected
flight, which will be consistently referred to as an example throughout the paper.
**** Insert Figure 2 around here *****
4.2 An example of a fare distribution: easyJet
Figure 2 is central for the whole analysis. Each graph, where a dot denotes a seat, represents
the fare distribution retrieved, respectively, 100, 35, 15 and 5 days to departure; the fare
of the first seat in the lowest bucket corresponds to the fare of the seat on sale, i.e., the
fare shown on the carrier’s website after a query for one seat.11 It is evident that these four
bi-dimensional distributions are qualitatively identical to the three-dimensional ones shown
in Figure 1. Considering that similar stepwise distributions characterize all the flights in
our sample, we can conclude that our data collection design yields compelling descriptive
evidence in support of property A. of Proposition 2.
In the top panels of Figure 2, the number of available seats is censored to 40; i.e, the graphs
do not show the extreme right tail of the price distribution, which is instead represented in
the two bottom panels, where, on the left, 38 seats remain to be sold, reducing to only 11 on
the right. Interestingly, bucket fares are repeatedly found over the booking temporal horizon,
thus suggesting that they tend to be used throughout most of the booking period, until they
are sold out or, more occasionally, emptied.
A visual inspection is sufficient to establish some interesting features of the distributions
and their evolution over time. One-hundred days to departure, the carrier had allocated five
seats for sale at the price of £38 (the per-seat price, net of booking fee, that a customer
buying up to 5 seats would pay), five seats at the price of £48, and so on and so forth. Due
11As discussed in the Appendix, the fares in the Figure are net of the booking fee.
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to the data censoring, we cannot ascertain the precise size of the last “bucket” valued at
£158. Similarly, the size of the £38 bucket is likely not correct, since there may be missing,
previously sold, seats. Sixty-five days later, the first two buckets are not found; only two
seats are available at the price of £58 and the size of the £158’s top bucket has clearly
increased to at least 18 seats, although the censoring still prevents us to precisely measure
its size. Interestingly, twenty days later, even without censoring the distribution is made up
of buckets whose fares are the same as the ones reported in the previous periods. Moreover,
the size of the second bucket (£80) has increased to five seats, and that of the top bucket
can now be precisely measured as equal to 19. Five days prior to departure, the carrier is
offering six seats at the price of £112, but noticeably, the size of the top bucket (£158) has
shrunk to only two seats.
It could be argued that Figure 2 exemplifies just the peculiar approach followed by easy-
Jet but that it is not representative of the industry. Therefore, in the next subsection we
generalize the analysis by providing several examples of similar fare distributions derived
from data collected from the websites of many other European and U.S. carriers, both Low
Cost and Full Service Carriers (FSCs).
4.3 Examples of fare distributions from other airlines
Figure 3, which is constructed using web crawling, shows the striking resemblance between
the fare distributions of easyJet and Ryanair, the largest European LCC. The censoring
point, which is caused by the limit on the maximum number of seats in a query imposed
by the website’s programming code, is in this case set at 25 seats. Interestingly, five days
to departure there are at least two, four and nine seats in, respectively, the £143, £121 and
£99 buckets. Two days later, the £143 bucket has disappeared, only two seats are allocated
to the £121 one, and the size of the £99 bucket has increased to thirteen seats. While the
price of the seats allocated in higher buckets has clearly fallen, in line with property B. of
Proposition 2 , the price of the seat on sale has increased from £84 to £99, as predicted by
Property A. That is, the main implications of this study could easily be extended to at least
another large players in the industry.12
Southwest allows queries with only a maximum number of seats restricted to eight and
it is therefore not possible to depict a fare distribution encompassing a number of buckets
as high as in the case of easyJet and Ryanair. Indeed, when holding the query date fixed,
for the majority of flights the eight seats carry the same fare, as it is shown for instance
12The original plan for this study was indeed to use data from both Ryanair and easyJet. However, the
adoption by the former of Captcha techniques made web crawling impossible. The limited amount of data
collected prior to this event, from which Figure 3 is derived, led us to the decision to focus on easyJet.
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in the first two left vertical panels in the top part of Figure 4.13 However, the data also
includes several examples exhibiting a jump upward from one bucket to the next, as in the
vertical panels for the departure dates 14, 10 and 7 in the top part of the Figure, and in
most of the panels in the bottom part. The Figure suggests that also Southwest organizes
the fares on its reservation system making use of a flight’s fare distribution where fares tend
to follow the sequence defined by the buckets’ rank. Indeed, in the top part of Figure 4, the
number of seats in the $270 bucket reduces from four to three seats between ten and seven
days to departure. In the bottom part of the same Figure, something similar happens to
the seats in the $341 bucket, which disappear three days before departure, when only two
seats at $414 remain. Overall, Figure 4 suggests that also Southwest, the largest U.S. LCC,
makes extensive use of fare distributions that are organized in a way similar to its European
counterparts.
As far as FSCs are concerned, the analysis is complicated by their adoption of a nested-
classes system, where the same seat can belong to different classes, each with different ticket
restrictions; therefore, one would need to retrieve a distribution for each class category, with
precise information on the number of seats (and classes) each category is designed to contain.
It is however possible to connect some features of FSCs’ pricing approach with the present
analysis based on fare distributions. For instance, various papers present graphical evidence
of the temporal profile of fares by FSC, i.e., they report the fare of the seat on sale and its
evolution over time (Escobari, 2012; McAfee and te Velde, 2007; Puller et al., 2009). It turns
out that such temporal paths also follow a step-wise pattern, which can be rationalised along
the terms we use to define a fare distribution. Indeed, one could view each bucket as a different
“fare class”, which, like buckets, is stored in the reservation system, regardless of whether it
is immediately available for sale or not. To shed light on this assumption, starting from 2nd
November 2016, we saved data from the website expertflyer.com, whose ‘Pro’ subscription
allows access to the list of fare classes (and associated fare and ticket restrictions) an airline
uses on a specific route (i.e., the list is not flight-specific). To minimize network pricing
effects, we chose one direct flights departing on 15 November 2016 operated by American
Airlines (AA), connecting New York JFK to Chicago ORD. In addition to the list of classes
from www.expertflyer.com, starting from the 3rd November 2016, we visited AA’s website
and recorded manually all the different fares therein reported.
In Figures 5, the posted fares are joined by a line; the other symbols refer to specific
classes listed by expertflyer.com, of which we report only the first letter.14 There are at least
13The data comes from a work in progress involving the authors and another scholar based in a U.S.
institution.
14For instance, the full code for the class Q in Figure 5 is Q7ALKNN3. It is noteworthy that expertflyer.com
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two main aspects worth highlighting. One, our analogy between buckets and classes appears
to be supported by the fact that expertflyer.com reports most classes for the full period,
regardless of the posted online fares. For instance, the non-refundable class N or G for a seat
in the main cabin (top panel of Figure 5) was available on the computer reservation system
during the whole period. Interestingly, the class Q in the top part of Figure 5 and the class
N in the central part cease to appear on the 8th November, i.e., seven days prior to the flight
departure.
It could be argued that the fare classes in Figure 5 are not relevant because they are not
specific to the flight under study; however, such a criticism is thwarted by the second aspect
the Figure shows. Indeed, we find that the website’s fares often perfectly match the class
fares reported by expertflyer.com. This happens for the days 6-8 and 10-12 November (classes
Q and N in the top part), 3-8 November (class N in central part), and 3-12 November (class
V 3 in bottom part).15 Interestingly, for the case of the Main Cabin lowest fare, the posted
fares depict a step-wise path with fare levels defined by predetermined fare classes. Although
with the limitations due to matching data from different sources, the short period of analysis,
and the fact that FSCs rely extensively on the traditional travel agents’ channel, the overall
analysis based on Figures 5 suggests that the notion of a fare distribution provides a useful
starting point for any investigation of FSCs’ pricing methods.
5 Descriptive analysis
To lay the foundations for the empirical strategy we will adopt to study the properties in
Proposition 2, we need to shed more light on the link between the fare distribution and
dynamic pricing (DP). Indeed, for property B., it is essential to describe “the hidden side”
of DP, i.e., how DP can take place even if the selling price does not change; as for property
A., we need to describe how the fare distribution operates like a template that, at each point
in time, defines the sequence of fares as the flights fills up.
5.1 Defining Dynamic Pricing
As Figure 2 suggests, DP clearly goes beyond the mere fluctuation of the price of the first
seat in the distribution. One of the novel aspects of this paper is to show that DP entails
a restructuring of the fare distribution, and that this practice may involve either a mod-
reports a very large number of classes, and that we only report those whose value is close to that of the posted
online fares.
15Due to time zone difference, we could retrieve the fares on the date of departure when in the USA it was
still nighttime.
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ification of the buckets sizes (i.e., a reallocation of remaining seats across buckets) or the
creation/deletion of bucket levels, or both. To fully capture this behavior, we now refer to
the entire set of data for the flight used in Figure 2, as reported in Table 2. Each cell contains
the bucket size, with columns identifying the days prior to departure and rows the bucket
price. The last row in each sub-panel indicates whether the number of available seats is
censored (that is, there are at least 40 or more seats left on the flight) or the precise number
of available seats (this is visible from fifteen days onwards in Panel B, when the maximum
number of prices observed is for 38 seats). The fare of the seat on sale corresponds to the
lowest fare of the bucket with a strictly positive number of seats.
Table 2 provides examples of the various forms of DP implemented by the carrier. We
define as DP any change in the distribution of seats across two sequential query dates. That
is, we do not consider as DP the fare increase from £31 to £38 that takes place between 129
and 121 days from departure, because it corresponds to a movement along the distribution
and is consistent with the selling out of the seats in the £31 bucket. Similarly, during the
last fortnight, the fare of the seat on sale assumes the values £68, £80, £96, £112; such
a movement does not count as DP because it automatically occurs when the first available
bucket becomes sold out and the system moves to the next available bucket level.
For a better visual identification, we use circles to denote cases of DP associated with
bucket size changes, and with rectangles the more standard DP cases of creation or deletion
of a bucket price level. Note, however, that the appearance or reappearance of a bucket
fare is equivalent to an increase of its bucket size from zero to a positive number of seats;
so effectively all forms of DP are equivalent to a reallocation of seats to an upper or lower
bucket. For instance, we do consider as DP the fare drop observed between 119 and 111 days
to departure, because it corresponds to a reopening of the £31 bucket. Similarly, between 2
and 1 days to departure when the number of available seats drops from 6 to 4, one seat is
moved up from the £112 to the £133 bucket.
More interestingly, based on our definition, DP takes place even if the fare of the seat on
sale remains unchanged (the “hidden DP”). This happens several times in the Table. For
instance, between 70 and 69 days to departure, the size of the £48 bucket increases from four
to six seats; another instance in which the bucket on sale is replenished is observed between
fifteen and fourteen days to departure, when six out of nine seats from the top £158 bucket
are moved down to the £68 bucket (each of the other three seats are reallocated to the £80,
£96 and £112 buckets, respectively).
****Insert Table 2 around here*****
To quantify DP consistently in our dataset and identify whether a seat has received a
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DP treatment, it is necessary to study what happens to that seat between two consecutive
booking days. In its simplest form, DP occurs if we observe a seat has changed its fare either
upwards or downwards; this implies a movement to a bucket that either has already been
observed as part of the distribution, as in the case of the reopening of the £48 bucket twenty-
one days to departure, or to an entirely new bucket. A complementary way is to look at
whether a seat’s bucket size has increased (e.g., 1 day to departure in Table 2), or decreased
(5 days to departure). For the case of the first seat on sale, if its bucket size decreases we
cannot distinguish whether that has happened due to a reduction of the available seats or to
DP, and so we limit the analysis to bucket size’s increases only. Overall, the distribution is
deemed to have changed whenever we register any of the above movements for at least one
seat.
The descriptive analysis of DP is carried out using only the non-censored observations
because doing so allows the position of each seat to be precisely identified. Consider again
the bottom left panel of Figure 2, when only 38 seats remain on the flight. If we look at the
distribution from the bottom up (left to right), the first seat is the one on sale, and the 38th
identifies the “last” seat that would be put up for sale. In the bottom right panel, the number
of available seats dropped to 11. In this case, the seat that occupied the 28th position in the
other panel is now the first seat (the seat has clearly dropped down two buckets); and the
position of the last seat would be now the 11th. That is, it is not possible to use the bottom-up
perspective to uniquely identify seats. However, if we assign the position using a top-down
approach (that is, we count seats starting from the extreme right of the distribution), it
turns out that in both panels the top right seat would be assigned a position equal to 1, the
one immediately on its left position equal to 2, etc; the first seat in the left bottom panel
would then take position 2. We report these values in a variable denoted as Position.16 That
is, over different query dates, we can track the evolution of each seat’s fare, as long as the
observation is non-censored.
5.2 Descriptive statistics on Dynamic Pricing
Table 3 reports the probability that each seat in the distribution is treated with one of
the forms of DP defined in the previous subsection, obtained by considering only variations
between query dates separated by one day (e.g., in Table 2, between 3 and 2 days to departure)
and only non-censored observations. The qualitative results do not change if the probabilities
were obtained considering variations between any two consecutive, but not adjacent, query
16We are using the same notation of the theoretical model where Position is identified by the reverse index
m.
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dates. The first four columns investigate whether a seat has moved up or down, that is,
whether it has moved to a bucket previously observed as part of the distribution or to an
entirely new one. The subsequent two columns report whether the size of the bucket where
the seat is positioned, has increased or decreased. The Table provides several insights into
how DP affects the fare distributions. First, consistent with the property B. of Proposition
2, the probability that a seat is moved to a lower bucket is much higher relative to that
of being moved in the opposite direction; the maximum probability of moving to a higher
bucket is about 5% for the seat in position 26, which also records a 17.6% likelihood to be
shifted down to a previously observed bucket. Second, the design of a fare distribution is
rarely altered by adding new buckets, given the generally low probability of observing the
creation of a new bucket. Third, and relatedly, the size of buckets in the right tail of the
distribution (i.e., those with low positions) tends to shrink, while seats in the left tail belong
to buckets whose size is more likely to increase. Indeed, the buckets for the seats in positions
1 to 9 exhibit a probability of more than 25% to be shrunk; conversely, the probability of a
size increase is larger for seats in lower positions 20 to 39. Overall, Table 3 provides strong
descriptive support to the role of the temporal dimension in driving down the option value
of all the seats in the fare distribution.
***** Insert Table 3 around here *****
Table 4 is based on the distance between the query date and the departure date. It
reports the probability of whether the overall distribution has received a DP treatment, that
is, whether at least one of the seats in Table 3 has changed bucket fare or size. The “Any
fare move” column reports the probability that the distribution has changed due to a fare
movement in either directions; similarly, the “Any fare change” denotes a change in bucket
size. The highest of these two values constitutes the probability that a distribution changes
during the specified booking period. The “Overall” row provides a sample estimate: on
average, a flight distribution has a probability of 48.6% of changing between two consecutive
days; that is, distributions change less than once every two days. There are however important
variations across the booking period. Distributions rarely change when more than fifty days
separate the query date from the date of departure: the probability of 21.1% implies that
distributions remain unchanged for about four out of five days. Between thirty-six and eleven
days to departure, the likelihood of observing a fare distribution increases drastically, but, in
line with property B that predicts a decreasing option value, this is largely due to seats being
moved to lower, pre-existing buckets. Moreover, even when frequently applied, DP does not
generally involve a drastic redesign of the fare distribution via the creation of new buckets;
this finding lends support to the new approach in this paper linking airline pricing and fare
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distributions. Finally, within ten days to departure the probability of a fare distribution
change drops again to values below 40%; that is, fares remain unchanged for about 2-3 days.
This period appears to be characterized by a larger (lower) probability to observe a movement
of seats towards higher (lower) buckets.
***** Insert Table 4 around here *****
A comparison between Table 4 and Table 5 indicates that changes in the distribution do
not necessarily involve the first seat on sale. For instance, between eleven and twenty-eight
days to departure, the probability of a downward fare movement of any seat in the entire
distribution is always higher than 70%, but it is less than 20% for the fare of the seat on
sale.17 Similarly, the size of the bucket where the first seat is placed increases less frequently
than in the full distribution. A possible exception can be found in the fare movement to a
higher bucket, where the two Tables present values which are similar but well below 20%;
that is, in the last three days, less than one flight out of five receives the treatment. Relatedly,
the total probability of a fare drop during the last three (seven to four) days is lower than
6.0% (9.0%) but it is reaches the value of about 20% between eleven and fourteen days to
departure. The fact that, during the last three days, the first seat is moved up to a higher
bucket consistently more than it is moved down suggests that DP can be used to pursue
an inter-temporal price discrimination strategy aimed at capturing the higher proportion of
customers with a higher willingness to pay, generally those flying for business purposes (Dana,
1998; Gale and Holmes, 1993). Overall, the type of DP most frequently applied to the seat
on sale appears to be that involving the increase in its bucket size, consistent with the idea
that the property B. of Proposition 2 is implemented by shifting seats initially allocated to
the higher-priced buckets to lower-priced ones, what we term as “the hidden DP”. Often, this
results in the replenishment of the bucket where the first seat is placed, leading to a slowing
down in the rate in which the selling fare would increase due to the pure capacity dimension
effect. For instance, in Table 2, the first bucket’s size increases significantly fourteen days to
departure, thus postponing the increase in the posted fare from £68 to £80.
*****Insert Table 5 around here *****
The foregoing descriptive analysis provides the necessary backdrop for Table 6, which
reports the mean fare of the same seat (i.e. with the same value of the variable Position) at
various clusters of days to departure. The numbers clearly indicate a decreasing pattern of
the mean fare as we approach the departure day, in line with the property B in Proposition
2. The decline appears to be inversely proportional to the position. That is, the last seat
17The fact that easyJet does not resort to last-minute deals to clear capacity was also noted in Koenisgsberg
et al. (2008).
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(Position = 1) drops from an average fare of £182 to £139; the 20th seat from the top also
has a starting mean of £181, which falls drastically down to £82. This is consistent with
what we observe in Figure 2, where, between fifteen and five days to departure, the left seats
in the £158 bucket end up being moved down by several buckets, unlike the last two on the
right.
***** Insert Table 6 around here *****
To sum up, a combined analysis of Tables 3-5, in addition to providing empirical support
to the properties of the equilibrium solution in Proposition 2, highlights several practical
aspects of DP in airline markets. First, DP takes many forms and shapes, all aimed at
redesigning the distribution of fares uploaded on the carrier’s reservation system; second,
fares are seldom added to the original structure of a distribution; third, changes in the
distribution are carried out at lumpy time intervals, so that a flight’s distribution remain
unaltered for an average of 2-3 days; fourth, DP treatments may not necessarily involve the
first seat in the distribution, whose bucket is however highly likely to increase in size.
6 Econometric design and analysis
We now proceed to test formally the two properties characterizing the equilibrium solution in
Proposition 2, by providing two sets of regressions. In the first, we consider the full sample,
and focus on how the fare of each seat in the distribution is affected by its position and
how it changes over time. The second regression sheds light on how the fare of the first
seat on sale changes as its position changes over time. As far as property A. is concerned,
we have already shown how the adoption of a fare distribution is pervasive and offers the
carrier a practical way to implement DP. The second regression shows that the capacity
dimension is responsible for the movement of the seat on sale along the distribution, leading
to a temporally increasing profile of the “easily observable” fare on sale, while the temporal
dimension operates in a “hidden” way. Both regressions lend strong support to property B.,
after the role of the capacity dimension is taken into account.
6.1 Full distribution analysis
To test both properties in Proposition 2, we estimate the following equation for the fare of
seat with Position = m on flight j departing on date d:
lnFaremjd =
∑
t
βtDt + γPosition
m + ζjd + εjdt, (8)
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where Dt defines a set of dummy variables Days to departure, with t defining the intervals
between the query and the departure date. As far as property B. is concerned, they represent
our variables of interest as they track the time evolution of the fare of a specified seat’s
position, which we expect to be declining, while Property A. would be supported by a negative
and significant coefficient of Position (recall that we count the position by starting from the
right of the distribution).
The econometric strategy takes into account two related sources of sample selection. One,
Position is identified precisely only when an observation is non-censored, and so we have to
restrict the sample to only those observations of flights that, on a given query date t, have
fewer than 40 seats left to sell (see Alderighi et al. (2015) for a similar problem). Two,
conditional on a flight being non-censored, seats in lower buckets have a higher probability
to be sold and disappear from the sample at an earlier stage, thus biasing the estimated
relationship of a seat’s fare over time. Formally:
FNCjdt =1[z1θ1 + ν1 > 0] (9)
smjdt =1[z1θ2 + θ3Position
m + ν2 > 0] if FNCjdt=1. (10)
When FNCjdt = 1, i.e., a flight jd is non-censored at booking day t, we can identify, out of
the possible 39 seats that the distribution may potentially include, the seats s in positions m
which are still available for sale.18 Under the assumptions (ν1, ν2) ∼ N(0, 1) and corr(ν1, ν2) =
ρ, (9)-(10) can be estimated using a bivariate probit with sample selection model (Greene,
2003, ch.21), where z1 includes the following regressors: dummies for the number of days
to departure, the day of the week of the departure date, the departure slot time (morning,
afternoon, evening, etc.), the season (Winter and Summer), the route (estimates available
on request). After obtaining the estimated coefficients (θˆ2, θˆ3) using all observations, the
estimated Mill ratios for the selected observations are: λˆmjdt(θˆ2, θˆ3) =
φ(z1θˆ2 + θˆ3Position
m)
Φ(z1θˆ2 + θˆ3Position
m)
.
We can then estimate an augmented version of (8):
lnFaremjd =
∑
t
βtDt + γPosition
m + λˆmjdt(θˆ2, θˆ3) + ζjd + ξjdt, (11)
by panel OLS fixed-effects.19
The panel identifier corresponds to the combination of flight-code plus day of departure;
18Imagine that at t we only retrieve fares for, say, the last 20 seats; these would have sjdt = 1. To estimate
(9)-(10), we would append observations for seats 21-39 and set sjdt = 0.
19The approach we follow to correct for the simultaneous presence of sample selection draws from procedure
17.1 in Wooldridge (2002).
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the panel’s temporal dimension is represented by a sequential counter that uniquely identifies
all the possible combination of Position for all query dates t.20 We set the earliest day to
departure dummy (Days to departure 51+) as reference group and cluster the standard errors
by route and week to take into account the possibility of flight-specific demand shocks on a
given day affecting the demand for all the flights on the route in a given week.21
***** Insert Table 7 around here *****
Table 7 reports the results. Models (1) and (2) use the full sample, while the others
focus the analysis to the case of flights in, respectively, “Leisure” and “Business” routes.
We do so to test whether the estimates for the full sample hold in sub-samples of more
homogeneous flights. Following Alderighi et al. (2016) and Gaggero and Piga (2011), the
routes’ classification is based on data derived from the “International Passenger Survey”
(IPS), a quarterly survey collected by the UK Office of National Statistics.22 Routes are
classified based on the passengers’ stated travel motivations. For each flight, we computed
the share of business travelers carried by all companies on the city-pair comprising the route
where the flight operates. Depending on whether such a share is below or above the value of
16 percent, routes are respectively labeled as “Leisure” or “Business”.
In odd-numbered models, which do not include the interaction between our variables of
interests, the estimates indicate qualitatively similar effects. First, the coefficient of Position
is, as expected, negative. That is, the econometric evidence indicates that the distributions of
all flights are structured as predicted in property A. of Proposition 2. Second, and relatedly,
the Position coefficient provides a rough estimate of the linear average gradient of the fare
distribution: such a value varies from 1.6% to 1.7%. There appear to be no difference between
Leisure and Business routes. Third, and more importantly, the Days to departure dummies
are also negative and their coefficients increase in absolute value as the departure date nears.
Considering that the reference category corresponds to seats in early posted observations,
the dummies’ coefficients suggest a downward trend for the average fare of all the seats in
the fare distribution, holding the position fixed. This finding is consistent with the view that
the carrier generally faces strong incentives to move the seat down to lower buckets as the
departure date nears and that such a move reflects a declining option value, as predicted by
property B. of Proposition 2. Interestingly, in the “Business” sample, the coefficients of the
20Alternatively, we could have incorporated either the variable Position into the fixed effect identifier so
that only the interaction model could be identified in the Fixed Effects estimation. The results would not
change. Estimates available on request.
21For instance, a large group booking for a Wednesday morning flight raise fares for this flight and may
induce other customers to select alternative flights on nearby days.
22The IPS does not cover routes with both endpoints outside the UK; hence, the combined number of
observation in models (3) to (6) is lower than in model (1)-(2).
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temporal dummies are somewhat larger in absolute magnitude, suggesting that in business
routes the carrier tends to drop its fares over time more than it does in leisure routes; this
results is not in line with the standard characterization of business travelers as customers
with a higher willingness to pay, whose need to travel is revealed only at a later stage of
the booking period (Alderighi et al., 2016). However, evidence not reported to save space
indicates that fares in business routes tend to be higher on average.
To get a better appreciation of whether the intensity of the decline over time varies with
the seat’s position, even-numbered models present an interaction of Position with the set
of Days to departure dummies. Because the interaction coefficients are all negative, it can
be inferred that the decline is stronger as the position value increases: the further a seat is
positioned from the top one, the larger the fall in the bucket order (and in fare) it experiences.
Figure 6 shows the predicted effects from model (2) of Table 7. Each line, which represents
the predicted relationship between fare and position, keeping the temporal dummies fixed,
defines a stylized, smooth version of the fare distributions in Figure 2. The slope varies to
reflect the interaction terms in model (2). When the position is fixed, each point depicts the
extent by which the average fare of each seat falls over time. Based on interaction coefficients
in Table 7, the drop over time is larger as the position increases, as also shown descriptively
in Table 6. For instance, the fare of seat 39 drops, on average, from a value around e4.8 = 121
to about e4.1 = 60; of seat 25 from about e4.9 = 134 to about e4.4 = 81, while for seat 1, the
last one to be sold, the predicted fare moves from e5.1 = 164 to only about e4.9 = 134.
***** Insert Figure 6 around here *****
The econometric analysis therefore provides compelling evidence of the persistent effects
of the hidden aspects of DP that the carrier implements to manage its yield; furthermore, it
strongly supports the joint operation of the capacity and temporal dimensions as drivers of
DP interventions.
6.2 The temporal profile of the seat on sale
As the foregoing discussion has highlighted, the use of a fare distribution bears important
implications on the first seat on sale, that is, the seat with the lowest fare and the largest
value for Position still available on a flight. Studying the fare of the seat on sale is important,
because all the existing empirical literature on airline pricing, whether it uses transacted or
posted fares, focusses exclusively on it. There is general consensus that the overall tempo-
ral profile of such a fare is upward sloping, with many papers reporting graphical and/or
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econometric evidence of fares increasing as the departure date nears.23 The pervasiveness
of such a correlation is strongly at odds with the theoretical prediction of fares falling as
the takeoff date approaches (Gallego and van Ryzin, 1994), as first highlighted in McAfee
and te Velde (2007). Subsequent empirical research has shown that after controlling for the
remaining capacity on a flight, the theoretical prediction of temporally declining fares largely
holds (Alderighi et al., 2015; Escobari, 2012).
Using the insights offered by the foregoing theoretical and empirical analysis, in this
section we investigate the extent by which the behaviour of the fare of the seat on sale
conforms to the evidence reported in the existing literature. While this provides further
validation to the approach adopted in the paper, the combined analysis of the capacity and
the temporal dimensions also helps clarify and consolidate an empirical approach to airline
pricing where both dimensions are always properly accounted for. To this purpose, the
econometric strategy hinges on testing properties A. and B. of Proposition 2 on the seat on
sale, using the specification in equation (11) modified to take into account that for such a
seat the censoring process can be modelled using equation (9) only.
***** Insert Table 8 around here *****
Considering their panel fixed-effect design, models (1) and (2) in Table 8 replicate the
regressions in McAfee and te Velde (2007), by first using the full sample with all observations,
and then only the non-censored sample, i.e., the one we use to estimate equation (11). Like
McAfee and te Velde (2007), the temporal trajectory is clearly either increasing or non-
declining, with sharp rises during the last week. In terms of our analysis, we could interpret
such result by saying that the capacity dimension is a stronger driving force than the temporal
dimension, that is, movements along the distribution more than offset the negative impact of
the declining option value. Recall, however, that fares may increase due to intertemporal price
discrimination, aimed at exploiting customers’ heterogeneity in terms of demand uncertainty
and willingness to pay, so that late fares may be pushed up to take advantage of the larger
proportion of business-people among potential buyers.
To tease out the possible separate impact of intertemporal price discrimination, we need
to control for the evolution of available capacity on the flight, as in model (3), which uses only
the non-censored observations to identify the number of seats left on the flight at a given point
in time. Importantly, for the seat on sale, the number of available seats corresponds to the
position of the first seat in the distribution. Such a property has important implications since
it allows a dual interpretation of the estimates. Indeed, unlike the estimates in Table 7 where
23see Alderighi et al. (2015); Bergantino and Capozza (2015); Clark and Vincent (2012); Escobari (2012);
Gaggero and Piga (2010); Koenisgsberg et al. (2008); McAfee and te Velde (2007); Stavins (2001) inter alia.
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each seat occupies a fixed position in the distribution, the position of the first seat varies
over time, and thus captures how the fare changes as the seat moves along the distribution.
Moreover, the dual interpretation in terms of available seats allows a comparison with the
results in the previous literature that looked at how the fare changes as the plane fills up, as
for instance Alderighi et al. (2015) and Escobari (2012).
The inclusion of Position in model (3) drastically alters the structure of the temporal
dummies to reveal a declining time path for fares, consistent with the prediction B. in this
paper. Relative to those posted fifty-one or more days from departure, fares posted twenty-
eight days or later are significantly different, and show a constant decreasing trend which
is minimally reversed in the last three days before departure. Indeed, the coefficient of the
“0− 3 days” dummy is slightly larger than the previous one (−0.363 vs. −0.373), hinting to
a U-shaped temporal profile (Alderighi et al., 2015; Bilotkach et al., 2010; Escobari, 2012).
Combined with the descriptive evidence reported in Table 5, showing a larger probability
of observing the DP treatment of a shift to a higher bucket for the first seat on sale, we
can conclude that the increasing part of the U-shaped temporal path can be ascribed to the
implementation of an inter-temporal price discrimination strategy by means of DP techniques
that increase fares above the natural progression due to the capacity dimension.
The latter, however, is by far responsible for the overall upward trend highlighted in mod-
els (1) and (2). Indeed, the Position’s coefficient of −0.019 is similar to the ones estimated
in Table 7, which, as discussed above, in this case can be interpreted in two ways. One, the
first seat on sale follows an increasing temporal profile determined by the structure of the
distribution. That is, the carrier tends to close a bucket once all the seats in that bucket are
sold out, so that automatically the fare of the next bucket becomes the one advertised on the
site. On average, a one-position movement to the right of the distribution increases fares by
about 1.9%. Our results thus provide a so far undetected perspective, that is, they directly
relate the evolution of the selling fare to the design of the fare distribution for all the seats
available on a flight at each point in time. Two, and equivalently, fares increase by the same
amount as an extra seat is sold.
The fact that the position of the first seat on sale varies over time suggests that the
variable Position is likely correlated with ξjdt in eq. (11), i.e., it is endogenous. So we use
two instruments in our identification strategy, similar to those in Alderighi et al. (2015). The
first one, Lag Position, is simply the mean of the two weekly lagged values of Position, where
the lags are intended over d and not t, that is, we take values for the same flights departing
on the same week day one and two weeks before. The use of lagged values guarantees the
instrument is not correlated with the shock ξjdt; furthermore, fare distributions are flight-
specific, and so is the ideal (from the airline perspective) rate of growth of a flight’s load
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factor. That is, the instrument is correlated with Position because the airline has likely
adopted for the past flights a similar distribution, as well pursued a similar booking curve
for the temporal progression of the load factor. The second instrument, holiday period, is
a dummy variable indicating whether the query date falls within a holiday period in UK
(Christmas, Easter, school breaks, etc) and captures possible differences on the demand side.
That is, the ticket purchasing activity in such periods is likely to be different from non-
holiday periods (e.g., when on holiday, a person has less time to spend planning future trips),
and thus seat fares are likely less affected by shocks. Despite the loss of observations due to
the use of a lagged instrument, the estimates in model (4) are equivalent to those in model
(3), and confirm the presence of a weak U-shaped temporal profile and a slightly stronger
capacity effect, with fares expected to increase by 2.0% every time an extra seat is sold.
The overall evidence we provide offers some insights into two aspects mentioned in the
literature review. As far as inter-temporal price discrimination is concerned, the estimates
indicate, during the last three days from departure, a weakening of the downward pressure
that fares receive due to the temporal dimension. We can link this result to the DP activity
on the first seat on sale in the form of its movement to a higher bucket. Notably, the evidence
suggests a connection between the central role played by the fare distribution as a building
block of airline pricing and its modification to implement price discrimination. As far as the
presence of strategic consumers is concerned, the first two models in Table 8 indicate that a
consumer would generally observe fares following an increasing trend, which Li et al. (2014)
describe as the standard way to curb the incentive to postpone purchase. Although the
temporal dimension is largely responsible for the upward trend of fares throughout the entire
booking period, we record an additional effect due to an inter-temporal price discrimination
motive during the last week.
7 Conclusions
This paper presents several strong reasons, both based on theoretical and empirical grounds,
for modelling airline pricing using the concept of a fare distribution. For instance, it allows
the investigation of many so far neglected aspects of Dynamic Pricing. Furthermore, it helps
solve the contrast between theory and empirical evidence illustrated in McAfee and te Velde
(2007).
Although not the central focus of the study, its main findings have profound implications
on the identification of inter-temporal price discrimination strategies in airline markets. For
instance, carriers may want to discriminate the business travelers’ segment from other lower
demand travelers, e.g., those traveling for leisure. Because the former are more likely to
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learn about their need to travel only a few days before the departure date and their de-
mand is quite inflexible, carriers would implement price discrimination by raising fares at a
specified interval before take-off. But because carriers use fare distributions, identifying the
discriminatory motive is only possible if the researcher can distinguish higher fares driven by
capacity considerations (i.e., the fare is high because only a few seats are left on the flight)
from discriminatory upward changes in the distribution that increase all relevant fares but
are not motivated by a change in a flight’s load factor. Although we find the carrier in our
study does not pursue an inter-temporal price discrimination strategy too intensively, the
approach set out in the paper could be fruitfully applied in future research.
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Table 1: Simulated observed number of seats for each bucket fare across booking periods
bkt pdf periods to departure, t
fares WTP 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
50 14/64
65 12/64 5 5 4
80 8/64 6 6 5 4 4 3 3 2 2 1
95 6/64 7 6 6 4 4 4 3 3 2 2 1
110 6/64 5 5 4 4 4 3 3 2 2 1 1
130 5/64 6 5 5 5 4 4 3 3 2 2 1
150 5/64 4 3 3 3 2 2 2 1 1 1
175 4/64 3 4 3 2 3 2 1 2 1
200 4/64 3 2 2 2 1 1 1
seats 39 36 32 22 22 19 16 13 10 7 3
Figure 1: Fare distribution and probability by periods to departure
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Table 2: Number of seats in each bucket price across days to departure
Panel A: days to departure 130-35
Days to dep. 130 129 121 120 119 111 110 109 100 81 79 70 69 50 49 48 36 35
Bkt. price
31 3 1 3 3 1
38 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
48 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 6 5 5 5
58 6 5 5 5 5 6 6 5 5 4 2 4 4 5 5 5 2 2
68 4 5 6 6 6 4 4 5 6 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 4 4
80 6 6 4 4 4 6 6 6 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 4 4
96 4 4 6 6 6 4 4 4 6 5 4 3 3 5 5 5 4 4
112 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 4
133 3+ 5+ 5+ 5+ 5+ 3+ 3+ 5+ 4 4 3 3 3 5 5 5 4 4
158 2+ 16+ 18+ 12+ 10+ 5+ 5+ 5+ 18+ 18+
Av. seats 40+ 40+ 40+ 40+ 40+ 40+ 40+ 40+ 40+ 40+ 40+ 40+ 40+ 40+ 40+ 40+ 40+ 40+
Panel B: days to departure 34-1
Days to dep. 34 22 21 20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 10 9 5 4 3 2 1
Bkt. price
31
38
48 1
58 2 5 5 4 2 2 2 1
68 4 5 5 5 5 4 4 5 1 7 3
80 4 5 5 5 5 4 4 5 5 6 6 6 6
96 4 5 5 5 5 4 4 5 5 6 6 6 6 1
112 4 5 5 5 5 4 4 5 5 6 6 6 6 6 6 5 3
133 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4
158 18+ 11+ 11+ 13+ 15+ 19+ 19+ 16+ 19 10 10 4 4 2 2 2 0 0
Av. seats 40+ 40+ 40+ 40+ 40+ 40+ 40+ 40+ 38 38 34 25 25 12 11 10 6 4
(a) The + sign indicates a censored value for either the bucket size or the number of available seats.
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Table 3: Probability to observe specific forms of Dynamic Pricing applied to each seat in a
fare distribution
Fare Change to
Position in Higher Higher Lower Lower Bkt size Bkt size Obs.
distribution bkt new bkt bkt new bkt increase decrease
1 0.017 0.012 0.043 0.004 0.074 0.267 126,108
2 0.014 0.011 0.043 0.004 0.076 0.273 123,188
3 0.015 0.010 0.051 0.004 0.067 0.273 120,613
4 0.033 0.010 0.074 0.005 0.079 0.280 118,288
5 0.033 0.010 0.084 0.005 0.085 0.275 115,919
6 0.028 0.010 0.092 0.006 0.091 0.268 113,364
7 0.026 0.009 0.097 0.006 0.099 0.266 110,815
8 0.025 0.008 0.097 0.006 0.103 0.260 108,156
9 0.023 0.008 0.100 0.007 0.109 0.258 105,217
10 0.023 0.009 0.110 0.008 0.119 0.252 102,138
11 0.025 0.008 0.112 0.008 0.126 0.244 98,979
12 0.034 0.010 0.133 0.010 0.130 0.237 95,416
13 0.041 0.003 0.141 0.004 0.135 0.228 92,138
14 0.040 0.004 0.141 0.005 0.138 0.218 88,913
15 0.039 0.004 0.142 0.005 0.142 0.205 85,466
16 0.038 0.004 0.144 0.005 0.146 0.197 81,680
17 0.038 0.005 0.149 0.006 0.148 0.187 77,882
18 0.047 0.007 0.164 0.008 0.151 0.169 73,808
19 0.044 0.007 0.161 0.008 0.153 0.157 70,005
20 0.042 0.008 0.159 0.009 0.157 0.147 66,351
21 0.043 0.009 0.167 0.011 0.163 0.134 62,392
22 0.041 0.008 0.163 0.011 0.167 0.127 58,544
23 0.041 0.009 0.163 0.012 0.169 0.119 54,831
24 0.042 0.011 0.174 0.016 0.178 0.110 50,852
25 0.048 0.006 0.174 0.009 0.179 0.101 47,133
26 0.050 0.008 0.176 0.011 0.185 0.091 43,497
27 0.047 0.009 0.175 0.012 0.189 0.083 39,881
28 0.045 0.010 0.176 0.016 0.197 0.071 36,253
29 0.044 0.012 0.165 0.019 0.208 0.063 32,768
30 0.041 0.013 0.164 0.023 0.217 0.052 29,364
31 0.038 0.016 0.162 0.028 0.221 0.044 25,811
32 0.038 0.019 0.149 0.031 0.223 0.038 22,395
33 0.033 0.022 0.137 0.034 0.231 0.034 18,919
34 0.032 0.024 0.127 0.042 0.244 0.031 15,559
35 0.028 0.025 0.114 0.048 0.258 0.025 12,162
36 0.022 0.022 0.113 0.052 0.276 0.024 8,948
37 0.020 0.018 0.100 0.074 0.305 0.020 5,945
38 0.019 0.013 0.086 0.121 0.341 0.011 3,386
39 0.014 0.005 0.038 0.139 0.446 0.000 1,334
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Table 4: Probability to observe specific forms of Dynamic Pricing applied to a fare distribu-
tion, over booking periods
Fare Change to
Days to Higher Higher Lower Lower Any fare Bkt size Bkt size Any size
departure bkt new bkt bkt new bkt move increase decrease change
0-3 0.176 0.038 0.143 0.013 0.330 0.198 0.160 0.229
4-7 0.109 0.040 0.206 0.021 0.327 0.182 0.196 0.231
8-10 0.136 0.042 0.235 0.030 0.374 0.218 0.243 0.280
11-14 0.131 0.047 0.743 0.106 0.822 0.675 0.776 0.799
15-21 0.161 0.051 0.729 0.090 0.840 0.707 0.804 0.820
22-28 0.120 0.059 0.786 0.106 0.874 0.631 0.839 0.861
29-36 0.106 0.036 0.621 0.106 0.726 0.544 0.677 0.700
36-50 0.058 0.040 0.406 0.046 0.464 0.341 0.444 0.457
51+ 0.024 0.048 0.158 0.019 0.211 0.129 0.187 0.191
Overall 0.141 0.042 0.350 0.045 0.486 0.341 0.372 0.412
Table 5: Probability to observe specific forms of Dynamic Pricing applied to the seat on sale,
over booking periods
Fare Change to
Days to Higher Higher Lower Lower Any fare Bkt size
departure bkt new bkt bkt new bkt move increase
0-3 0.138 0.029 0.053 0.006 0.226 0.083
4-7 0.087 0.030 0.074 0.011 0.202 0.068
8-10 0.101 0.029 0.075 0.014 0.218 0.084
11-14 0.073 0.033 0.198 0.063 0.367 0.308
15-21 0.071 0.040 0.118 0.049 0.279 0.309
22-28 0.056 0.046 0.109 0.064 0.275 0.394
29-36 0.043 0.030 0.073 0.082 0.228 0.355
36-50 0.032 0.026 0.076 0.025 0.158 0.274
51+ 0.019 0.014 0.057 0.015 0.105 0.105
Overall 0.098 0.031 0.093 0.025 0.247 0.150
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Table 6: Mean fares by Position in fare distribution and days to departure
Position in Days to departure
distribution 36+ 35-29 28-22 21-15 14-11 10-8 7-4 3-0
1 182 171 172 167 158 152 146 139
2 182 171 172 167 158 152 145 137
3 182 171 171 167 156 150 143 134
4 182 171 171 165 152 143 134 124
5 182 171 170 164 150 141 131 120
6 182 170 170 163 146 137 127 116
7 182 170 169 161 143 135 125 113
8 182 170 168 160 141 133 122 111
9 182 170 167 158 138 131 120 109
10 182 169 166 156 136 128 117 107
11 182 169 164 154 134 126 115 105
12 186 169 162 151 131 121 110 101
13 185 168 161 149 128 119 108 99
14 185 167 159 147 126 117 106 97
15 185 166 156 144 124 115 104 96
16 184 164 154 141 122 114 102 93
17 183 163 151 139 120 111 99 90
18 183 161 148 136 117 106 94 86
19 182 160 146 133 116 105 93 84
20 181 157 143 131 114 103 90 82
21 179 155 140 128 111 100 88 80
22 177 152 138 126 110 99 86 79
23 175 149 135 123 108 97 84 77
24 173 146 132 121 105 94 81 75
25 170 142 130 118 104 92 79 73
26 167 139 127 115 102 88 76 71
27 164 136 125 113 100 86 74 69
28 161 133 122 111 98 84 72 68
29 158 130 120 109 96 82 71 67
30 154 128 117 106 95 80 69 66
31 150 125 115 104 92 78 68 65
32 147 122 113 102 90 76 65 64
33 144 120 111 100 88 74 63 63
34 141 117 108 98 86 71 62 62
35 139 115 106 96 84 69 60 61
36 137 115 104 94 82 67 58 60
37 134 112 102 93 80 65 56 60
38 131 111 99 90 78 64 55 58
39 127 111 94 90 77 62 54 60
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Table 7: OLS Regression analysis of the price of all seats in the distribution (Option value)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable log(p) log(p) log(p) log(p) log(p) log(p)
Sample All routes All routes Leisure Leisure Business Business
Days to departure 0-3 -0.280*** -0.030 -0.272*** -0.005 -0.320*** -0.114*
(0.001) (0.057) (0.063) (0.090) (0.041) (0.053)
Days to departure 4-7 -0.275*** 0.006 -0.272*** 0.024 -0.304*** -0.064
(0.001) (0.057) (0.063) (0.090) (0.041) (0.053)
Days to departure 8-10 -0.265*** 0.038 -0.266*** 0.056 -0.282*** -0.022
(0.001) (0.057) (0.062) (0.089) (0.040) (0.053)
Days to departure 11-14 -0.211*** 0.069 -0.215*** 0.094 -0.220*** 0.008
(0.001) (0.057) (0.062) (0.089) (0.040) (0.053)
Days to departure 15-21 -0.107*** 0.170** -0.106 0.205* -0.115** 0.097
(0.001) (0.057) (0.062) (0.089) (0.040) (0.053)
Days to departure 22-28 -0.056*** 0.185** -0.047 0.228* -0.079* 0.086
(0.001) (0.057) (0.061) (0.089) (0.040) (0.053)
Days to departure 29-35 0.008*** 0.191*** 0.019 0.233** -0.019 0.078
(0.001) (0.056) (0.061) (0.089) (0.039) (0.052)
Days to departure 36-50 0.023*** 0.127* 0.037 0.168* -0.020 0.010
(0.001) (0.053) (0.057) (0.084) (0.037) (0.049)
Position -0.016*** -0.002 -0.017*** -0.001 -0.017*** -0.006***
(0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001)
Position*Days to dep. 0-3 -0.019*** -0.021*** -0.014***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Position*Days to dep. 4-7 -0.020*** -0.022*** -0.016***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Position*Days to dep. 8-10 -0.020*** -0.021*** -0.015***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Position*Days to dep. 11-14 -0.017*** -0.019*** -0.012***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Position*Days to dep. 15-21 -0.016*** -0.018*** -0.011***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Position*Days to dep. 22-28 -0.013*** -0.016*** -0.008***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Position*Days to dep. 29-35 -0.010*** -0.012*** -0.004***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Position*Days to dep. 36-49 -0.006*** -0.007** -0.000
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Heckman’s λ -0.102*** -0.015*** -0.092*** -0.000 -0.103*** -0.023***
(0.000) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
R2 0.70 0.71 0.69 0.71 0.72 0.73
Observations 5,510,306 5,510,306 2,430,891 2,430,891 2,087,774 2,087,774
(a) Flight-code fixed effects.
(b) ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, at 5% and at 10% level.
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Table 8: Regression analysis of the price of the first seat on sale
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable log(p) log(p) log(p) log(p)
Estimation technique OLS-FE OLS-FE OLS-FE IV-FE
Sample All obs. Not cens. obs. Not cens. obs. Not cens. obs.
Days to departure 0-3 0.785*** 0.323*** -0.363*** -0.393***
(0.007) (0.038) (0.074) (0.101)
Days to departure 4-7 0.666*** 0.205*** -0.373*** -0.399***
(0.007) (0.038) (0.073) (0.101)
Days to departure 8-10 0.490*** 0.050 -0.370*** -0.388***
(0.006) (0.038) (0.072) (0.100)
Days to departure 11-14 0.403*** -0.005 -0.307*** -0.318***
(0.005) (0.038) (0.071) (0.099)
Days to departure 15-21 0.351*** -0.026 -0.211*** -0.216**
(0.005) (0.038) (0.070) (0.099)
Days to departure 22-28 0.305*** -0.035 -0.121* -0.122
(0.005) (0.038) (0.069) (0.099)
Days to departure 29-35 0.277*** 0.000 -0.020 -0.022
(0.004) (0.038) (0.068) (0.098)
Days to departure 36-50 0.170*** -0.005 0.027 0.026
(0.003) (0.037) (0.065) (0.094)
Position=Available Seats -0.019*** -0.020***
(0.000) (0.001)
Heckman’s λ -0.022* -0.024*
(0.011) (0.013)
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM stat 709.215***
Hansen J-stat .00318
R2 0.568 0.411 0.622 0.629
Observations 901,751 252,063 252,063 174,066
(a) Flight-code fixed effects.
(b) ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, at 5% and at 10% level.
36
Figure 2: Fare distribution at various days to departure
Legenda - Flight EZY8716 from Lisbon (6:45) to London Gatwick (9.25) on 22 Jun 2014
Figure 3: Fare distribution at various days to departure (Ryanair)
Legenda - Flight FR 8547 from Berlin Schonefeld (21:55) to London Stansted (22:40) on 21 Oct 2011
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Figure 4: Fare distribution at various days to departure (Southwest). ‘Wanna Get Away’
fares.
Upper Flight - Chicago MDW (6:00) to New York LGA (9:05) on 9 Nov 2012
Lower Flight - Chicago MDW (18:20) to Los Angeles on 21 Sept 2012
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Figure 5: American Airlines, JKF-ORD on 15 November 2016
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Figure 6: Predicted marginal effects of Position and days to departure on prices.
Note: based on Model (4) in Table 7.
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A Appendix - For Online Publication
A.1 Proofs
Proof. of Proposition 1
Non-negativeness. Non-negativity of V can be easily shown from (2) by induction since
V (t,M) comes from the maximization over p of sums and products of nonnegative terms.
Increasing in both arguments. We show that V (t,M) ≥ V (t− 1,M). By contradiction
assume that V (t,M) < V (t− 1,M). Let p∗ (τ,m) with τ = 1, . . . , t− 1 and m = 1, . . . ,M , be the
set of fares that solves (2) when there are t−1 periods and M seats. Define pˆ (τ,m) with τ = 1, . . . , t
and m = 1, . . . ,M , as a set of fares (not necessarily the optimal one) that is chosen when there
are t periods and M seats: pˆ (τ + 1,m) = p∗ (τ,m), for τ = 1, . . . , t − 1 and pˆ (1,m) = p¯ ∈ (0, θ¯).
Then, under this fare profile the expected return gained in the first t − 1 periods is V (t− 1,M).
Because ϕ < 1, there is a positive probability that some seats are available in the last period (t = 1),
and they generate positive expected revenue, which contradicts our assumption. The proof that
V (t,m) ≥ V (t,M − 1) is similar to the previous case.
Decreasing difference in t and M and increasing differences in (t,M). We organize this
part of the proof in different steps.
Step 1. We introduce the following notation: ∆1 (t,M) = V (t,M)−V (t− 1,M) and ∆2 (t,M) =
V (t,M) − V (t,M − 1). Note that decreasing differences in t and M can be, respectively, defined
as:
∆1(t,M) ≤ ∆1(t− 1,M), ∆2(t,M) ≤ ∆2(t,M − 1). (A.1)
Moreover, increasing differences in (t,M) is guaranteed by one of these two equivalent expressions:
∆2(t− 1,M) ≤ ∆2(t,M), ∆1(t,M − 1) ≤ ∆1(t,M). (A.2)
Indeed, we can write: V (tH ,M)− V (tL,M) = ∆1(tH ,M) + ∆1(tH − 1,M) + · · ·+ ∆1(tL + 1,M).
Thus, increasing difference property as in Definition 2 requires that the following inequality holds
∆1(tH ,MH) + ∆1(tH − 1,MH) + · · · + ∆1(tL + 1,MH) ≥ ∆1(tH ,ML) + ∆1(tH − 1,ML) + · · · +
∆1(tL + 1,ML), or ∆1(tH ,MH)−∆1(tH ,ML) + ∆1(tH − 1,MH)−∆1(tH − 1,ML) + · · ·+ ∆1(tL +
1,MH)−∆1(tL + 1,ML) ≥ 0. This is guaranteed by (A.2).
Step 2. We rewrite the Bellman equation in an useful way. First note that (2) can be rephrased
as:
∆1(t,M) = max
p
{q (p) [p+ V (t,M − 1)− V (t− 1,M)]} (A.3)
= max
p
{q (p) [p+X(t,M)]} ,
where X(t,M) = V (t,M − 1)− V (t− 1,M). Note that the solution of the maximization problem
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p = arg maxp {q (p) [p+X]} does not change since we have added a constant term X(t,M). More-
over, from the Envelope theorem, ∆1(t,M) is increasing in X. Therefore, it is possible to state the
following result:
∆1(t,M) ≤ ∆1(t− 1,M) ⇐⇒ X(t,M) ≤ X(t− 1,M) (A.4)
⇐⇒ V (t,M − 1)− V (t− 1,M) ≤ V (t− 1,M − 1)− V (t− 2,M)
⇐⇒ ∆1(t,M − 1) ≤ ∆1(t− 1,M).
Moreover:
∆1(t,M − 1) ≤ ∆1(t,M) ⇐⇒ X(t,M − 1) ≤ X(t,M) (A.5)
⇐⇒ V (t,M − 2)− V (t− 1,M − 1) ≤ V (t,M − 1)− V (t− 1,M)
⇐⇒ ∆2(t− 1,M) ≤ ∆2(t,M − 1).
Similarly, (2) can be rephrased as:
∆2(t,M) = max
p
{q (p) p+ [1− q (p)] [V (t− 1,M)− V (t,M − 1)]} (A.6)
= max
p
{q (p) p+ [1− q (p)]Y (t,M)} ,
where Y (t,M) = V (t− 1,M) − V (t,M − 1). Also in this case, from the Envelope theorem,
∆2(t,M) is increasing in Y . Therefore:
∆2(t,M) ≤ ∆2(t,M − 1) ⇐⇒ Y (t,M) ≤ Y (t,M − 1) (A.7)
⇐⇒ V (t− 1,M)− V (t,M − 1) ≤ V (t− 1,M − 1)− V (t,M − 2)
⇐⇒ ∆2(t− 1,M) ≤ ∆2(t,M − 1).
Moreover:
∆2(t− 1,M) ≤ ∆2(t,M) ⇐⇒ Y (t− 1,M) ≤ Y (t,M) (A.8)
⇐⇒ V (t− 2,M)− V (t− 1,M − 1) ≤ V (t− 1,M)− V (t,M − 1)
⇐⇒ ∆1(t,M − 1) ≤ ∆1(t− 1,M).
Previous results presented in (A.5), (A.6), (A.8) and (A.9) can be summarized as follows:
∆1(t,M) ≤ ∆1(t− 1,M)⇐⇒ ∆2(t− 1,M) ≤ ∆2(t,M)⇐⇒ ∆1(t,M − 1) ≤ ∆1(t− 1,M) (A.9)
∆1(t,M − 1) ≤ ∆1(t,M)⇐⇒ ∆2(t,M) ≤ ∆2(t,M − 1)⇐⇒ ∆2(t− 1,M) ≤ ∆2(t,M − 1)(A.10)
Note that inequalities presented in (A.1) are equivalent to those presented in (A.2). Thus, in order
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to show that V (t,M) has decreasing differences in t and M and increasing differences in (t,M) we
can only need to prove that inequalities presented in (A.1) are satisfied.
Step 3. We proof that inequalities in (A.1) are satisfied by induction. We start to show
that inequalities in (A.1) hold for any (t, 1) or (1,M), with t = 1, 2, .., T and M = 1, 2, .., N .
When M = 1, from (A.4), X(t, 1) = −V (t − 1, 1). Since V (t − 1, 1) ≥ V (t − 2, 1), using (A.5),
we have that X(t, 1) ≤ X(t − 1, 1) and ∆1(t,M) ≤ ∆1(t − 1,M). Similarly, when t = 1, from
(A.7), Y (t,M) = −V (t,M − 1). Since V (t − 1,M) ≥ V (t − 2,M), using (A.8), we have that
X(t,M) ≤ X(t− 1,M) and ∆2(t,M) ≤ ∆2(t,M − 1).
Because we have two different indices (t,M), in order to provide a proof by induction we need
to introduce an ordering, ((t,M),≺), on the indexes t = 1, 2, ..T and M = 1, .., N . We assume
that there is a lexicographic order in (t,M), i.e. (t′,M ′) ≺ (t,M) when t′ < t or when t′ = t and
M ′ < M . Thus, we have to prove two different cases.
Case a. We assume that inequalities in (A.1) hold for (t−1, N) and we want to show that they
hold for (t, 1). This has been already done above.
Case b. We assume that inequalities in (A.1) hold for preceding values of (t,M), in particular
for (t− 1,M) and (t,M − 1), and we want to show that they hold for (t,M). Using as assumption
that the first inequality of (A.1) holds for (t,M − 1) and that the second inequality of (A.1) holds
for (t− 1,M), we obtain:
∆1(t,M − 1) ≤ ∆1(t− 1,M − 1) ≤ ∆1(t− 1,M). (A.11)
Using (A.9), we obtain the proof that the first inequality in (A.1) is satisfied for (t,M).
Similarly, using as assumption that the second inequality of (A.1) for (t− 1,M) holds and that
the first inequality of (A.2) holds for (t,M − 1), we obtain:
∆2(t− 1,M) ≤ ∆2(t− 1,M − 1) ≤ ∆2(t,M − 1). (A.12)
Using (A.10), we obtain the proof that the second inequality in (A.1) is satisfied for (t,M).
Proof. of Corollary 1
It directly follows from (A.1) and (A.2) and by the fact that X(t,M) = ∆2(t,M)−∆1(t,M).
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A.2 Algorithm
As noted in proof of Proposition 1, (2) can be written as:
V (t,M) = max
p
{q (p) [p+ V (t,M − 1)− V (t− 1,M)]}+ V (t− 1,M) (A.13)
with boundary conditions V (t, 0) = 0 and V (0,M) = 0, for any t ∈ {0, . . . , T} and M ∈ {0, . . . , N}.
To find a solution for the problem described in (A.4), we consider the following steps.
Step 1. Find the solution for maxp∈Θ q (p) (p+X). Since Θ is compact, there exists a solution for
the problem.
Step 2. Set t = 1 and M = 1.
Step 3. Compute X = V (t,M − 1)− V (t− 1,M) and use Step 1 to get p (t,M). Replace it in (A.4)
to obtain V (t,M).
Step 4. Set m = m+ 1. Repeat Step 3 until m = N .
Step 5. Set t = t+ 1 and m=1. If t < T , then go back to Step 3.
A.3 Data treatment
This Section contains further details on the procedure we applied to derive the fare distributions
from the posted fares.
Through data visual inspection, we learnt that the carriers’ posted fare follow this rule:
PF (s) =
C +
∑s
j=1 pj
s
, (A.14)
where s denotes the number of seats in the query, PF (s) the corresponding posted fare, pj the fare
of each seat, starting from the first one available for sale and C is a fixed charge which we interpret
as a fixed commission per booking. The presence of C implies that the distribution of posted fares
over seats is generally U-shaped, with the decreasing part due to the commission being spread over
more seats and the increasing part due to the increasing values of buckets, as in Figure 2.
To find C, we rely on the fact that in most cases the first and the second seat are likely to belong
to the same bucket. Therefore C (and the value of the first bucket) can be obtained by solving the
following system of two linear equations in two unknowns, using the identity p1 = p2 = p:
PF (1) =C + p
PF (2) =(C + 2p)/2
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The commission changed over the sampling period: it amounted to £5.5 until 25 June 2014, then
to £6 until 6 May 2015 and subsequently to £6.5. For flights priced in euro the corresponding values
are e7, e7.5 and e8.5 with changes taking place simultaneously to the fares in British Pounds.
The values in the two currencies are highly related to the exchange rate in the various periods.
After finding C, using (A.14) it is straightforward to derive the bucket fare tags, Pj :
Pj = j ∗ PF (j)− (j − 1) ∗ PF (j − 1) with j ∈ [2, 40], (A.15)
with P1 = PF (1)− C.24
Two aspects are noteworthy. First, the procedure to derive the bucket values does not impose any
restriction on the monotonicity of the distribution. Second, and most importantly, the distributions
we derive correspond exactly to the distributions advertised on the carrier’s website. As discussed
in the Data Collection section, for each query the crawler retrieved the information that appears
on the booking page regarding the “number of seats available at that fare”.25 We can then gauge
the extent to which the size of each bucket, obtained from (A.15), conforms with the information
provided by the carrier. It turns out that the above procedure generates buckets’ sizes that perfectly
correspond to the sizes implied by the information posted by the carrier on the number of seats
available at a given fare. We take this as a strong indication that we succeeded in reverse-engineering
the carrier’s pricing approach.
24For simplicity, cents and pennies are rounded to unity.
25This and the other website’s features illustrated in the paper were still operative at the date this paper
was completed.
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